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Abstract 
In 2011, on the initiative of US President Barack Obama 8 governments and 9 civil society 
organizations (CSOs) came together to create the Open Government Partnership (OGP). The 
OGP was proclaimed as a new paradigm in promoting open government and democratic 
principles through the creation of participatory mechanisms involving governments and CSOs. 
This article aims to examine in more detail if the OGP, after 5 years in existence, has lived up 
to the initial proclamations as a new model of democracy-promotion at the global level. 
Departing from theoretical considerations on the potential of participatory mechanisms for the 
promotion of democratic processes, the article analyzes the OGP processes of 3 founding 
members, Brazil, the US and the UK. Although the structure of the OGP is highly innovative 
in many respects, the findings suggest that the governments of the 3 countries examined have 
used the OGP as a smoke screen to distract from on-going corruption, lacking transparency and 
government secrecy. This article contributes to research on the possibilities and challenges of 
effectively democratizing global governance mechanisms through the involvement of 
governments and civil society actors.  
 
Keywords: Brazil; Civil Society; Global Democracy; Open Government Partnership; 
Transparency; UK; 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 3 
 
 
The Open Government Partnership: Mere Smokescreen or New Paradigm? 
 
The Open Government Partnership (OGP) is a relatively new global governance mechanism 
with the aim to promote open government and democratic practices. Hailed by its founding 
members as a paradigm shift in democracy-promotion, this article attempts to find out if the 
OGP really represents a new paradigm. Or if the OGP resembles no more than a convenient 
smokescreen for the participating governments, an artificial cloud of smoke, to distract civil 
VRFLHW\¶VFRQFHUQVDERXWZLGHVSUHDGVHFUHF\DQGODFNRIWUDQVSarency in government activities. 
    During his administration, US President Barack Obama has strongly promoted open 
government as one of several key initiatives. In January 2009, on his first day in Office, Obama 
signed the Memorandum on Transparency and Open Government in which he pledged to create 
a more transparent, participatory and collaborative government (Obama, n.d.). In December 
2009, Obama issued an Open Government Directive establishing specific deadlines for action 
which include the online publication of government information, the improvement of the 
quality of government information, the creation and institutionalisation of a culture of open 
government in government agencies and the creation of a policy framework for open 
government (The White House, 2009). One year later, Obama presented his Open Government 
Initiative at the UN General Assembly pledging for new commitments in the fight against 
corruption, promoting transparency and empowering civic engagement (Weinstein, 2013, p. 4).  
   In 2011, as a result of this international call, 8 governments (Brazil, Indonesia, Philippines, 
Mexico, Norway, South Africa, the United Kingdom and the United States) and 9 
representatives from CSOs1 in the field of transparency and open government came together in 
New York at the UN General Assembly to launch the Open Government Partnership 
(Weinstein, 2013, pp. 4-7; CGU, n.d).  
   The OGP aims to promote democracy in the participating countries by creating mechanisms 
which increase the availability of information about government activities, support civic 
participation, implement codes of conduct for public officials and improve the access to new 
technologies for openness and accountability (OGP, 2012, pp. 19-21). This approach was hailed 
by its founders as a new model of cooperation on spreading democratic values. One of the 
principal architects of the OGP, Stanford Professor of Political Science Jeremy Weinstein, 
described the novelty of the OGP in the following words: 
 
We felt a need to reclaim the language of democracy-promotion ± to put the focus on 
SHRSOH¶V XQLYHUVDO DVSLUDWLRQ WR KDYH D VD\ LQ KRZ WKH\ DUH JRYHUQHG DQG RQ WKH
common challenges of political leaders in responding to that desire. The emerging 
FRQFHSWRI³RSHQJRYHUQPHQW´ZDV ORRVHDQGIOH[LEOHQRWDWWDFKHG WRDQ\SDUWLFXODU
ideology. It allowed anyone to bring his own agenda to a common goal. It was essential 
to place innovation at the front and center of any new effort, moving away from a 
                                                          
1
 The Brazilian Institute for Socioeconomic Studies INESC, the Indian Association for the Empowerment of 
Workers and Peasants MKSS, the Mexican Institute GESOC (Gestión Social y Cooperación), the Open 
Government Institute from Moldavia, Twaweza from Tanzania, Publish What You Pay from Indonesia, the British 
Transparency and Accountability Initiative, the Revenue Watch Institute from the US and the International Budget 
Partnership. 
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IUDPHZRUN LQ ZKLFK GHYHORSLQJ FRXQWULHV ZHUH XQGHU SUHVVXUH WR DGRSW WKH ³EHVW´
practices of the West, toward one in which domestic reformers and activists were 
empowered to share their stories, and countries were encouraged to learn from one 
another and take further actions in a meaningful race to the top. (Weinstein, 2013, p. 5) 
After five years in existence, the OGP has enjoyed widespread recognition among governments. 
The number of participating countries has skyrocketed from the initial eight founding countries 
to 65 participating countries, with most countries from the American and European continents. 
In the participating countries, the OGP has also been able to initiate a debate on the necessity 
of open government and the crucial role of civil society actors in this process, bringing together 
civil society actors and governments to jointly work on promoting the OGP principles (Vasani, 
2013). Given this international expansion and the involvement of CSOs from all around the 
world, it is time to examine in more detail if the OGP is delivering on its promises and turning 
into an encouraging partnership to support participatory mechanisms for the promotion of 
transparency and open government in the participating countries.  
   The article first elaborates theoretically how civil society participation has the potential to 
make government activities more transparent and, as a result, more democratic. Thereafter, the 
article introduces the principal structure and decision-making mechanisms of the OGP. Next, 
the article examines how 3 founding countries - Brazil and the US as the first two co-chairs, 
and the UK as the organizer of the OGP summit 2013 in London -, all of them very vocal 
supporters of the OGP, have implemented the OGP principles. By comparing the activities of 
these three countries, the article aims to find out if the OGP, after five years in existence, can 
be taken seriously as a new paradigm in global governance. 
 
 
Strengthening democracy through participatory mechanisms 
At first sight, the OGP constitutes a worthwhile global project. Its founders emphasized the 
necessity of creating participatory mechanisms between governments and citizens to promote 
WKH 2*3¶V objectives and, as such, democracy. To effectively promote government 
transparency and accountability it is not enough for a government to make government 
documents publicly available or share data over the Internet. Although these efforts represent a 
crucial first step, they do not necessarily lead to a more open government and more democracy. 
Open government only stands a chance when it is wedded to participatory mechanisms which 
force government officials to be held accountable to their citizens (Peixoto, 2013, p. 206).  
   Elections represent the most widely established mechanism of accountability in democracies. 
But elections alone do not make a democracy. Instead, a well-functioning democratic system 
GHSHQGVRQ µPXOWLSOHDYHQXHV IRU WKH ³SHRSOH´ WRH[Sress their interests and preferences, to 
influence policy, and to scrutinize and check the exercise of state power continuously, in 
EHWZHHQHOHFWLRQVDVZHOODVGXULQJWKHP¶'LDPRQGS7KHSHRple, however, need 
to be organized in a vibrant civil society to exercise influence and contribute to a more 
strengthened and consolidated democracy.  
   Abundant literature has examined the crucial role of civil society and participatory 
mechanisms involving government agencies and CSOs in strengthening democratic processes 
throughout the world (Diamond, 1999; Edwards, 2014, Elliott, 2003). CSOs contribute to the 
development and consolidation of democracy by (1) monitoring, checking and restraining state 
power, (2) stimulating citizen participation in political processes, (3) educating citizens about 
their rights and duties and (4) creating new channels of access to political processes (beyond 
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formal elections) for citizens to articulate their interests (Diamond, 1999, pp. 239, 242-243). 
Thus, the key to mRUHGHPRFUDF\LQDFWLYLWLHVRQRSHQJRYHUQPHQWUHIHUVWRµWKHFRPELQDWLRQ
of (publicized) transparency and institutions that promote governmental responsiveness and 
empower citizens to partake in public decision making WKDWOHDGVWRVXEVWDQWLYHDFFRXQWDELOLW\¶
(Peixoto, 2013, p. 207).  
   In the field of open government, these participatory mechanisms are still rare. Participatory 
budgeting, however, represents a noteworthy exception. Participatory budgeting was 
championed in the 1980s by the Brazilian city of Porto Alegre where community organizations 
together with representatives and bodies of the municipal government decide on the municipal 
budget and jointly manage public resources (De Sousa Santos, 1998). This new paradigm 
spread to more than 300 other Brazilian cities and municipalities in the following two decades 
and to more than 1000 outside of Brazil (Fedozzi, 2014, pp. 51-52).  
   And yet, not every single participatory budget automatically reinforces democracy. Each 
participatory budget has its own structure and dynamics. Not every municipal government 
which introduced participatory budgeting actively involves CSOs in budgetary decisions. 
Instead, more often than not the participatory mechanisms created to foster a meaningful 
dialogue between the government and civil society are characterized by weak and isolated 
structures, lacking resources and low levels of engagement of government representatives and 
thus serve largely to boost the image of the government instead of serving the citizens (Fedozzi, 
2014, pp. 54-55). Only when municipal governments are seriously willing to democratize their 
government activities by involving marginalized groups and community organizations in 
budgetary decisions, showing the capacity to lead with conflictive opinions and guaranteeing 
the financial resources for an efficiently working infrastructure, can participatory budgeting 
become a new paradigm leading to more transparency and accountability (Fedozzi, 2014, p. 
56).  
   Similarly to the importance of civil society in strengthening national democracies, civil 
society participation also has the potential to strengthen the democratic processes of global 
governance mechanisms. There is widespread agreement that CSOs are significant actors in 
contributing to a more just and democratic global order by representing the needs and interests 
RI ORFDO FRPPXQLWLHV PRQLWRULQJ WKH JRYHUQPHQWV¶ DFWLYLWLHV KROGLQJ WKHP DFFRXQWDEOH WR
human rights standards and exercising pressure through social campaigns (Florini, 2000; 
Kaldor, 2003; Scholte, 2011). But ultimately, CSOs remain largely excluded from the principal 
decision-making processes of global governance mechanisms and international organizations. 
Hence, an opportunity to strengthen democratic processes in global governance arises when 
governments cooperate with CSOs and invite them to play an essential role in decision-making 
processes.  
 
 
The Global Structure of the Open Government Partnership 
The 2*3¶VSteering Committee (SC) serves as its main decision-making body consisting of 22 
members with 11 representatives each from OGP participating countries and civil society. One 
of the fundamental principles of the SC refers to maintaining parity between civil society and 
the governments. The representatives of both constituencies were elected in 2011 by each 
constituency for a three-year term with the possibility to be re-elected. The chairmanship of the 
SC comprises two government chairs and two civil society chairs, which are all selected by the 
SC members.  
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   Through an annual rotation process launched in 2014, two governments and three civil society 
organisations are annually substituted to bring new voices and perspectives to the SC (OGP, 
2015a). In the case of the governments, the new SC members are elected by all participating 
countries. In the case of the CSOs, a selection committee reviews nominations. The members 
of both constituencies must adhere to the OGP principles and participate in the SC meetings on 
a regular basis. In the same vein, in both constituencies, a regional balance must be respected. 
For the governments, this means that all world regions must be represented and not more than 
four governments should be from one region. For the CSOs, every region must be represented 
by at least one representative with no more than two representatives from North America and 
nor more than three from each of the other regions (Latin America and the Caribbean, Africa, 
Asia/Oceania and Europe). In addition, international organisations, networks, and coalitions are 
to be represented each by at least one person and a maximum of two (OGP, 2015a). Any 
government and CSO can apply for membership in the SC (and be re-elected) if they adhere to 
the principles, mission and agenda of the OGP. The key principles of the OGP are summarized 
in the Open Government Declaration, which any new participating member must endorse, and 
refer to the increase of the availability of information about governmental activities, the support 
of civic participation, the implementation of the highest standards of professional integrity 
through the administration and the increase of access to new technologies for openness and 
accountability (OGP, 2011).  
   Decisions in the SC are consensus-based. In the election or re-election of its government 
members, the Steering Committee takes into account the performance of present member 
governments,2 regional diversity, and adherence to OGP principles. Governments are elected 
or re-HOHFWHGE\DOO2*3SDUWLFLSDWLQJFRXQWULHVRQWKHEDVLVRI³one country, one voWH´&62V 
are elected by the civil society members of the SC on the basis of the recommendations of a 
civil society selection committee consisting of two current SC civil society members and three 
other organizations from the civil society community (OGP, 2012, pp. 5-9). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
2
 Achievements, publication of all required OGP documents like assessment reports, etc., adherence to the Open 
Government Declaration, providing financial support for OGP and attending SC meetings.  
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Figure 1: Steering Committee 
 
 
   In an annual plenary meeting, the OGP Annual Conference, all OGP stakeholders come 
together do debate key issues concerning open government and the OGP (OGP, 2012, p. 4). So 
far, three annual conferences took place, the first one in Brasília (2012), the second one in 
London (2013) and the third one in Mexico City (2015). In 2014, the OGP Steering Committee 
organized a High-Level Side Event during the UN General Assembly Session (OGP, 2014). In 
addition, the OGP organized in 2014 several regional conferences in different world regions to 
concentrate on the key challenges open government poses for countries and communities within 
those particular regions, such as the Asia-Pacific Regional Meeting, the Europe Meeting and 
the Americas Meeting (OGP, 2015b).  
   One of the cornerstones of the OGP refers to the promotion of civic engagement and the 
cooperation between governments and the national and/or local civil society communities in 
the promotion of the OGP principles. In the OGP Steering Committee, the civil society 
community is on an equal footing with the governments sharing with them the same decision-
making powers. To further increase its voice and support its own coordination efforts the civil 
society community has established its own mechanism, the so-called Civil Society Engagement 
Team (CSE).3 The CSE works to strengthen the international civil society network around OGP 
and the national networks in the OGP participating countries to better represent civil society in 
the OGP and in the participating countries. The CSE created an OGP civil society hub which 
serves as a worldwide platform for civil society actors on all issues concerning the OGP, 
LQFOXGLQJWHFKQLFDOLVVXHVDERXWRSHQJRYHUQPHQWWKHIXQFWLRQLQJRI2*3¶VVWUXFWXUHDQGKRZ
to pressure participating countries into meeting their targets.  
   With this structure in place, how does the OGP actually go about promoting the OGP 
principles of open government in the participating countries? Every government of a 
participating country is required to develop a two-year Action Plan in which the country is 
required to identify at least one of the five OGP grand challenges (Improving Public Services, 
Increasing Public Integrity, More Effectively Managing Public Resources, Creating Safer 
                                                          
3
 See http://www.ogphub.org/ Retrieved 01 April, 2016. 
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Communities, and Increasing Corporate Accountability) and specific commitments to tackle 
the challenge(s). Governments need to create annual reports on the progress of their 
commitments, the so-called self-assessment reports. After two years, independent researchers 
assess the progress made in the respective country through the so-called independent progress 
UHSRUWV ZKLFK VHUYH DV WKH 2*3¶V SULQFLSDO DFFRXQWDELOLW\ PHFKDQLVP 6LQFH WKH 2*3
understands itself as a voluntary partnership, every government is free to formulate its own 
commitments and create its own national infrastructure to pursue the pledges outlaid in the 
Action Plan, as long as they respect the OGP principles.  
   On its official website, the OGP publishes all documents concerning the functioning of the 
partnership including financial contributions from member states, the Action Plans, 
independent progress reports, SC minutes of meetings and application letters of governments 
and CSOs for membership or re-election in the SC. Similarly, when the independent progress 
reports are put online they can be commented on by the public including representatives of 
CSOs and the governments. These comments are then also published on the website.  
   Considering its structure, the OGP is highly innovative in several respects. The Steering 
Committee is not only equally controlled by state and non-state actors but aims to represent 
CSOs and governments from the developed and developing world alike. From the very 
beginning, the OGP was conceived as a forum to exchange different experiences on open 
government and learn from the other instead of imposing particular agendas or ideas from the 
µ:HVW¶ (Weinstein, 2013, pp. 4-5). This approach is reflected in the voluntary nature of OGP 
membership, the composition of the SC4 and the free choice of governments on how to design 
their own national institutions to coordinate the national OGP process.  
 
 
The Performance of the Governments of Brazil, the US and the UK 
The case of Brazil: A new global leader on open government? 
Brazil and the US were the first two governmental co-chairs of the OGP and have been its most 
vocal advocates. Brazil has a long history of political corruption and government secrecy and 
has only very recently begun to promote open government initiatives to increase transparency 
and access to information. But very similar to US President 2EDPD¶VUHQHZHGIRFXVRQRSHQ
government initiatives, then Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff (2011-2016) has principally 
emphasized the introduction of measures to scale up the fight against political corruption, 
increasing transparency and access to information through the adoption of the Law of Access 
to Information in 2012 (Waisbich, January 22, 2015).  
   The high attention Brazil has paid to WKH2*3LV UHIOHFWHG LQ WKHJRYHUQPHQW¶V pro-active 
stance within the OGP by acting as its first co-chair and hosting the first annual OGP High-
Level Conference in Brasília in 2012 (Hage, 2013, p. 9). Jorge Hage, who as the Head of the 
&RPSWUROOHU*HQHUDO¶V2IILFHEHWZHHQDQGVHUYHGDV the founding co-chair of the 
OGP, highlighted some of the reasons why the OGP has so much appeal for the Brazilian 
government: 
                                                          
4
 Current composition of the Steering Committee as of April 2016: Governments: Brazil, Chile, Croatia, France, 
Georgia, Indonesia, Mexico, Romania, South Africa, the United Kingdom and the United States. Civil 
society: World Resources Institute, Open Government Institute, Open Democracy Advice Centre, GESOC 
(Gestión Social y Cooperación), Results for Development, IFID (International NGO Forum on Indonesian 
Development), Natural Resource Governance Institute, International Budget Partnership, Transparency & 
Accountability Initiative. The two remaining civil society seats are currently vacant (OGP, 2016).  
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The OGP is a multi-stakeholder approach to governance challenges countries have been 
facing for decades by themselves. However, every participating country agrees that 
WKHUHLVQR³RQHVROXWLRQILWVDOO´IRUWKHVHFKDOOHQJHV:HFDQKHOSHDFKRWKHUE\VKDULQJ
experiences, sharing successes and lessons learned >«@, but we cannot tell each what 
the best way to go is. Our goal in OGP is to foster change by our examples, by our strong 
commitment to engaging society in the crafting of solutions for the governance 
problems we face every day. (IACC, 2011) 
 
   In September 2011, the Brazilian government created the Inter-ministerial Committee on 
Open Government5 as the principal body to elaborate and develop the Action Plans and lead 
the process of implementing the OGP principles in Brazil. The Committee is composed of 18 
ministries and directly coordinated by the Cabinet Office of the Presidency. Within the 
Committee, an Executive Group is responsible for the elaboration of the Action Plans. The 
Executive Group is coordinated by the Office of the Comptroller General, an anti-corruption 
body which was created in 2003 to assist the Presidency in defending public property and 
increasing transparency of government activities (CGU, 2014).  
   In its first Action Plan (2011-2013), Brazil presented 32 commitments to be implemented in 
the first two-year period. In early 2012, the Inter-ministerial Committee established a Civil 
Society Working Group, an online discussion group and an online process called Virtual 
Dialogue to support the dialogue between the government and civil society (Coelho and 
Waisbich, 2013, p. 3; Waisbich, January 22, 2015; Machado, February 06, 2015). The 32 
commitments referred to the capacitation of government officials in activities revolving around 
access to information, the implementation of the law of access to information, citizen 
participation (i.e. the organization of a National Conference on Transparency and Social 
Control, a National Meeting on Open Data, a National Seminar on Social Participation, etc.), 
Open Data, the increase of transparency and public integrity, corporate responsibility and the 
improvement of public services (Coelho and Waisbich, 2013, pp. 35-71). Although these 
commitments appear impressive at first sight, most of these actions had already been in 
planning and preparation well before the creation of the OGP GXHWR%UD]LO¶VDGRSWLRQRIWKH 
Law of Access to Information, which was elaborated in 2009 and entered into force in 2012 
(Coelho and Waisbich, 2013, p. 75; Waisbich, January 22, 2015; Machado, February 06, 2015).  
   In addition, the Action Plan and the JRYHUQPHQW¶Vactivities complied very loosely with the 
OGP principles, as several civil society activists involved in the process emphasized (Coelho 
and Waisbich, 2013, pp. 27-28; Waisbich, January 22, 2015; Marchezini, January 29, 2015; 
Machado, February 06, 2015): (1) The elaboration of the Action Plan was largely carried out 
by the government, led by the Office of the Comptroller General, and restricted to the ministries, 
ZLWKRXW VLJQLILFDQW LQYROYHPHQWRI %UD]LO¶V FLYLO VRFLHW\ (2) The Office of the Comptroller 
General invited selected CSOs, such as Article 19, Transparency Brazil, The Institute for 
Socioeconomic Studies (INESC) (one of the founding CSOs of the OGP), the Ethos Institute, 
the Public Policy For Access to Information Research Group at the University of São Paulo and 
other well-known Brazilian organizations in the field which had already worked together with 
the Office of the Comptroller General for several years. (3) Instead of being given the 
opportunity to provide any input to the Action Plan, CSOs were largely used in the public 
consultation process to legitimize the Action Plan. (4) The Civil Society Working Group 
                                                          
5
 See the website at http://www.governoaberto.cgu.gov.br/. Retrieved August 31, 2015.  
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established by the Inter-ministerial Committee turned out to be a paper tiger with no real 
influence, quickly sidelined by the Office of the Comptroller General.  
   This negative experience of several civil society representatives in the elaboration of the 
Action Plan provoked huge disappointment and frustration (Waisbich, January 22, 2015; 
Marchezini, January 29, 2015; Machado, February 06, 2015). The OGP process developed 
without the serious and effective involvement of civil society, even though many civil society 
organizations were highly organized and enthusiastic about becoming involved in the process 
(Waisbich, January 22, 2015, Marchezini, January 29, 2015; Machado, February 06, 2015). The 
Forum of Transparency, Participation, and Social Control, created in 2012, represents the civil 
VRFLHW\¶VPRVWLPSRUWDQWYHKLFOHLQGHPDQGLQJPRUHWUDQVSDUHQF\RSHQgovernment and social 
participation from the government (CONSOCIAL n.d). In its efforts to demand more active 
participation in the OGP process, the Forum sent several letters to the cabinet office of the 
Brazilian president, the general secretariat of the Brazilian president and the then director of the 
Comptroller General Jorge Hage, demanding a restructuring of the Inter-ministerial Committee 
along the lines of the International Steering Committee of the OGP to include representatives 
from civil society and guarantee a more effective participatory process (CONSOCIAL 2014). 
Although the Inter-ministerial Committee has not been restructured, the Comptroller General 
established a new Civil Society Working Group in November 2014 to assist the government in 
developing the second $FWLRQ3ODQ&RPSWUROOHU*HQHUDO6LQFHWKH:RUNLQJ*URXS¶V
main function is limited to consulting and accompanying the work of the Inter-ministerial 
Committee (Comptroller General 2014, pp. 1-2), it is questionable how this mechanism can 
increase effective civil society participation in the &RPPLWWHH¶VGHFLVLRQ-making process.  
   The elaboration of the second Action Plan (2013-2015) largely resembled an unimaginative 
repetition of the mistakes made during the first Action Plan (2011-2013), even though the initial 
consultation process seemed rather promising to CSOs (Steibel 2015, pp. 68±70, Marchezini, 
January 29, 2015). However, when civil society representatives realized that the dynamic 
consultation process at the beginning did not turn into meaningful collaboration, with civil 
society shut out from the ultimate decision-making process, many civil society organizations 
abandoned the process in disillusionment (Steibel 2015, pp. 68±70; Waisbich, January 22, 2015, 
Marchezini, January 29, 2015; Machado, February 06, 2015).  
    In addition to the first signs of disintegration of the OGP process in Brazil, the government 
FKDQJHDIWHU5RXVVVHII¶VVXFFHVVIXOLPSHDFKPHQWSURFHVVLQ$XJXVWKDVQRWLQVSLUHGKXJH
confidence into the new government headed by Michel Temer. As paralyzed as the Rousseff 
government was by the on-going revelations of a gigantic corruption scandal, the new 
government in place is not less tainted by allegations of corruption (The Economist 2015). In 
additLRQ RQH RI WKH ILUVW DFWV RI 5RXVVHII¶V VXFFHVVRU ZDV WR GLVVROYH WKH 2IILFH RI WKH
Comptroller General and integrate its functions into the new Ministry of Transparency, 
Supervision, and Control. In this context, it is hard to believe that %UD]LO¶V government is 
energetic and dynamic enough to revive the disintegrating OGP process, let alone to contribute 
to a new paradigm on open government.  
 
 
The case of the US: Yes We Can? 
At the launch of the OGP in New York in 2011, US President Obama used the following words 
to describe how the Open Government Partnership can create a new paradigm in the fight 
against corruption, government secrecy, and lacking transparency: 
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I challenged our countries >«@ with specific commitments to promote transparency, to 
fight corruption, to energize civic engagement, and to leverage new technologies so we 
FDQVWUHQJWKHQWKHIRXQGDWLRQVRIIUHHGRPLQRXURZQFRXQWULHV>«@:H¶UHMRLQHGE\
nearly 40 other nations who've also embraced this challenge, with the goal of joining 
WKLVSDUWQHUVKLSQH[W\HDU$QGZH¶UHMRLQHGE\FLYLOVRFLHW\RUJDQL]DWLRQVIURPDURXQG
the world -- groups that not only help hold governments accountable, but who partnered 
with us and who offer new ideas and help us to make better decisions. Put simply, our 
countries are stronger when we engage citizens beyond the halls of government. So I 
welcome our civil society representatives -- not as spectators, but as equal partners in 
this initiative. (The White House, 2011) 
Obama explicitly highlighted the fact that governments and civil society actors meet as equal 
partners as a prerequisite to the success of the OGP. Obama clearly stressed the principal 
innovation the OGP represents: the promising potential to create a new paradigm in 
international cooperation and the efforts of governments and societies all around the world to 
strengthen and consolidate democracy.  
   The US government created 26 commitments in its first Action Plan (2011-2013), coordinated 
by a working group within the Executive Office of the President comprising representatives 
from 35 government agencies (OGP, 2013, pp. 3, 13). Most of the commitments in the Action 
Plan were inspired by work already under way in the context of the implePHQWDWLRQRI2EDPD¶V
2009 Open Government Directive (OGP, 2013, p. 15). In the elaboration of the first Action 
Plan consultations with civil society took place and were promoted by the government, but it 
was not clear how the Action Plan benefited from this consultation process (OGP, 2013, p. 15). 
The quality of the public consultation process only improved significantly when the civil 
society coalition OpenTheGovernment.Org, a large coalition of transparency and accountability 
organizations, stepped in to better coordinate and facilitate the dialogue between civil society 
and the government (OGP, 2013, p. 16; OpenTheGovernment.Org 2013, p. 3). Without the 
initiative of this already existing and well organized civil society coalition, the involvement of 
civil society would have been much poorer in quality and impact (OGP, 2013, p. 17; 
OpenTheGovernment.org 2013, p. 3-5).  
   In the second Action Plan (2013-2015), the government continued to interact with the civil 
society network, but in a rather half-hearted way. Although the government organized several 
open meetings with civil society and used modern Internet communication tools such as blogs 
and other online platforms, CSOs REVHUYHGWKDWµmany [government] agencies still struggle to 
open up to FROODERUDWLRQ DQG FULWLFLVP¶ (OpenTheGovernment.Org 2015, p. 2). While the 
commitments of the first Action Plan were not particularly ambitious, the commitments of the 
second Action Plan did little to change this picture. The potential impact of almost all the new 
commitments was moderate at best (Piotrowski 2015, pp. 3-8). And only two of the 26 
commitments could be regarded as potentially transformative.6 An actual paradigm change in 
open government or in the relations between the government and civil society would look very 
different. And yet, civil society has not lost hope. On the contrary, the coalition network uses 
the OGP process to increase its pressure on the government by pushing for more participation. 
The coalition even started to elaborate WKHLURZQµ0RGHO1DWLRQDO$FWLRQ3ODQV¶ as a blueprint 
for the government to use.7 The coalition OpenTheGovernment.Org has been the most active, 
                                                          
6
 The creation of a transparency initiative for executive industries (commitment 11) and measures to increase the 
transparency of federal spending (commitment 13) (Piotrowski 2015, p. 6).   
7
 See the following website for more information on this collaborative civil society process:  
http://www.openthegovernment.org/taxonomy/term/1194. Retrieved April 01, 2016.  
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passionate and enthusiastic actor in the OGP process, but it has been known for this activism, 
passion, and enthusiasm for more than 10 years.8   
   So, it is difficult to see the innovations the OGP has brought. And all the controversies 
revolving around surveillance and government secrecy do not contribute to the image of the US 
government as a new leader on open government initiatives. In 2013, three controversies 
emerged in the US, which clearly questioned the seriousness of the US commitment to the OGP 
and its principles. First, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) targeted opposition political groups 
based on their applications for tax-exempt status and subjected them to burdensome extra 
inquiries and investigations, which provoked a nation-wide scandal (Goldfarb and Tumulty, 
2013). The IRS, albeit an independent enforcement agency, has an unfortunate history as an 
agency used by presidents to intimidate political enemies (Goldfarb and Tumulty, 2013). The 
media cRYHUDJHDQGDFFXVDWLRQVIURPWKHRSSRVLWLRQXQGHUPLQHGWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VFUHGLELOLW\
on open government (Goldfarb and Tumulty, 2013). Almost simultaneously, several national 
security issues arose, when in the name of national security several government agencies 
collected data from journalists and prosecuted government officials to find potential leaks of 
information (Goldfarb and Tumulty, 2013). As a third controversy, revelations about 
surveillance practices of US citizens on US territory did not improve tKH JRYHUQPHQW¶V
credibility (Goldfarb and Tumulty, 2013). Add the controversies about the revelations of the 
US goveUQPHQW¶V secret surveillance practices of foreign heads of state VXFKDV%UD]LO¶Vformer 
President Rousseff, together with Obama the founder of the OGP, the seriousness of the US 
commitment to the OGP can be further questioned (Borger, 2013). It is even more bewildering 
to see that in March 2015 the White House Office of Administration exempted itself from the 
regulations under the Freedom of Information Act (Korte 2015). In other words, transparency 
and open government no longer apply to the Office of Administration of the White House, the 
official residence of the president who called into life the Open Government Partnership.  
    
 
The case of the UK: The most open and transparent government in the world? 
The former British Prime Minister David Cameron was highly enthusiastic about open 
government, pledJLQJWRPDNHWKH8.JRYHUQPHQWµthe most open and WUDQVSDUHQWLQWKHZRUOG¶ 
(OGP 2015c). At the 2013 OGP Annual Summit in London, Cameron left no doubt about the 
engagement of the UK government in the OGP process.  
:H¶YHJRW WRJLYHRXU IXOO-throated support for the groups that support and promote 
transparency, not least the Open Government Partnership. This is a truly exciting 
institution. Rather than getting bogged down in endless communiques, the Open 
Government Partnership is about concrete reform. (UK GOV 2013) 
   The UK government embarked on the OGP process with the creation of an impressive 41 
commitments. And yet, the LQGHSHQGHQW UHSRUW IRXQG WKDW µthe first action plan was heavily 
influenced by what government was already doing or planned to do, with a particular focus on 
open GDWD¶ (Dunion, 2013, p. 14). Although the government actively engaged CSOs through 
different channels, civil society participation was limited (Dunion, 2013, p. 14). The OGP 
process in the UK is coordinated by the Cabinet Office Transparency Team consisting of 
government officials only (Dunion, 2013, p. 16). A civil society forum was established as a 
                                                          
8
 6HH DQ RYHUYLHZ RI WKH FRDOLWLRQ¶V KLVWRU\ DQG LPSDFW DW http://www.openthegovernment.org/our_impact. 
Retrieved April 01, 2016.  
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platform to better discuss upcoming issues among CSOs, but most participants µsaw the action 
plan as dominated by technical and procedural matters regarding WKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VRZQLQWHUQDl 
SURFHVVHVWRRSHQXSLWVGDWD¶ (Dunion, 2013, p. 21).  
   Very similar to Brazil and the US, the UK government had already prepared a bill to be 
adopted well before the launch of the OGP, the Protection of the Freedom Bill, which passed 
through Parliament in 2012 (Dunion, 2013, p. 67). In terms of the practical impact of the 
commitments, µthe focus has shifted to stimulating a culture of disclosing information rather 
than creating obligations, and a light touch approach is preferred over heavy±handed iQVLVWHQFH¶ 
(Dunion, 2013, p. 68). After civil society criticism, the government has reacted and taken more 
seriously the public consultation process involving over 30 stakeholders in a much more 
structured approach, including regular meetings in the Cabinet Office, with the aim to produce 
commitments much more focused on the OGP principles (Dunion, 2013, p. 69).  
   The unsatisfying experiences of the development of the first Action Plan led civil society 
actors in 2012 to the formation of a civil society network and the creation of the position of a 
civil society coordinator, assumed by the organization Involve, to agree on a common vision 
and better coordinate among civil society and the government (UK OGP Network 2015, p. 4).9 
As a result of this civil society initiative, the second Action Plan was developed in a much more 
collaborative and open environment between government representatives and the civil society 
network. This process included open meetings with government officials and civil society 
representatives and a public consultation process based on the draft Action Plan leading to the 
joint elaboration of commitments and a more ambitious plan than the first one (UK OGP 
Network 2015, pp. 5-6; Worthy 2015, p. 113). The network clearly empowered the position of 
CSOs vis-à-vis the government supporting civil society members in their discussions with 
government officials (UK OGP Network 2015, p. 12). Notes of the joint meetings on the 
drafting of the Action Plan were published on the QHWZRUN¶VEORJUK OGP Network 2015, p. 
13).  
   Although the process of the second Action Plan worked much better than the first one, civil 
society actors still faced two major obstacles. First, CSOs had to cope with the restricted use of 
government IT and the unreliable access to Google docs important for the drafting process. The 
second obstacle, which is much more worrying, referred to the insufficient engagement of many 
government officials. This included a two-month period in which no interaction between the 
government and civil society took place due to a shortage of government staff, seriously putting 
in danger the finalization of the Action Plan (UK OGP Network 2015, pp. 15-16; Worthy 2015, 
p. 113). This lack of sufficient government engagement led to consternation and frustration 
among civil society members who saw the positive outcomes of their enthusiastic engagement 
threatened (UK OGP Network 2015, pp. 15-16). While the consultation process had been 
considerably improved, the potential impact of almost all 21 commitments of the second Action 
Plan is moderate at best (Worthy 2015, pp. 4-10). Only four commitments can be seen as 
µFOHDUO\UHOHYDQWWR2*3YDOXHV¶ZLWKDSRWHQWLDOO\WUDQVIRUPDWLYHLPSDFW:RUWK\SS-
10).10         
   The UK government, as in Brazil and the US, remained largely passive, mostly reacting to 
civil society pressure and leaving the hard work to the newly formed civil society coalition. 
                                                          
9
 See the website of the UK Open Government Civil Society Network at www.opengovernment.org.uk. Retrieved 
April 01, 2016. 
10
 The development of a cross government anti-corruption plan (commitment 6), the creation of a publicly 
accessible central registry of company beneficial ownership (commitment 7), the publication of information on 
official development assistance (commitment 14) and the implementation of a global standard of financial 
transparency and accountability in the extractive industries (commitment 21) (Worthy 2015, pp. 4-10).  
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And the minimal progress achieved was mostly the result of the coalLWLRQ¶VUHOHQWOHVVZRUN$s 
in the cases of Brazil and the US, it would be a stretch to call this process a paradigm shift. The 
EULJKWVSRWLQWKH8.¶V2*3SURFHVVWKHIRUPDWLRQRIWKH2*3FLYLOVRFLHW\QHWZRrk, and with 
it a better organization of the existing civil society actors, is still the best innovation the process 
has brought.  
    And recent attempts of the UK government to restrict the Freedom of Information Act (of 
course, without public consultation and clear justification) cast further shadows on the 
JRYHUQPHQW¶VDPELWLRQDQGZLOOLQJQHVVWRKRQHVWO\HQJDJHLQWUXO\RSHQJRYHUQPHQWLQLWLDWLYHV 
(Hughes 2015)%RWKWKHXQVDWLVIDFWRU\2*3SURFHVVDQGWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VVXVSLFLRXVDWWHPSWV
WRXQGHUPLQH WKH)UHHGRPRI ,QIRUPDWLRQ$FWVHULRXVO\TXHVWLRQ'DYLG&DPHURQ¶VERDVWIXO
claim of turning the UK government into the most open government in the world.  
 
 
 
Mere smokescreen or new paradigm? It is up to the governments to decide! 
The vision and institutional structure of the Open Government Partnership promised to make 
government activities more transparent and accountable through the creation of participatory 
mechanisms involving the active participation of civil society actors. Both the voluntary 
character of the OGP and the fact that the participating governments are allowed to create their 
own structures and find their own answers to lacking transparency and accountability in 
government activities avoid one-size-fits-all solutions and the imposition of grand models and 
programs by Western countries on developing countries. And it is this potential which made 
civil society actors in all the three countries examined passionately embrace this international 
initiative.  
   This great strength, however, also represents a great weakness. The governments are primarily 
responsible for the creation of participatory mechanisms which match their own respective 
social context. The governments have no excuse for their negligence. They already have a 
model to follow, the proper Steering Committee of the OGP. In the SC, both governments and 
civil society actors meet as equal partners and together take decisions on all international 
aspects of the OGP. Given the rotation principle and elections, the SC is not limited to a selected 
group of governments and civil society organizations.  
   None of this was established in the three countries analyzed. Instead, the national steering 
committees in Brazil, the US, and the UK are in the firm grip of government representatives 
ruling out any chance for civil society actors to become equal partners. It is ironic that civil 
society organizations in all three countries complained about the recurring lack of transparency 
in the public consultation process, even though the whole exercise of the OGP process is about 
increasing transparency and treating civil society organizations as equal partners.  
    Instead, the findings in this article raise the suspicion that the governments lead civil society 
actors E\WKHQRVHZKHQFODLPLQJWRµZHOFRPHFLYLOVRFLHW\DVHTXDOSDUWQHUV¶ (Obama). Neither 
do civil society actors participate on an equal footing with the governments nor have the 
governments gone to great lengths to guarantee meaningful civil society participation. The civil 
society participation in the OGP processes in Brazil, the US and the UK can be credited to the 
tireless efforts of civil society itself and not to the generous activities of government agencies.  
   In this sense, the OGP represents a smokescreen serving the governments to show off with 
trumpeting speeches and boasting statements about their serious commitment to open 
government, while in fact trying to deflect from on-going secrecy, lack of transparency and 
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corruption in government affairs. The %UD]LOLDQ JRYHUQPHQW¶V LQYROYHPHQW LQ D JLJDQWLF
corruption scandal, the suspicious activities of the UK government regarding the Freedom of 
Information Act and revelations about surveillance of journalists in the US speak volumes.  
    And when the smoke finally dissipates, the whole damage becomes clearly visible. The 
disintegrating OGP process in Brazil stands as a warning signal for how much damage the 
governmeQW¶VDWWLWXGHFDQLQIOLFWRQLWV relations with civil society. As a result of the Brazilian 
JRYHUQPHQW¶V XQZLOOLQJQHVV WR LQWHJUDWH FLYLO VRFLHW\ RUJDQizations in its open government 
initiatives, those organizations have become demoralized and the whole Brazilian OGP process 
delegitimized, sowing distrust and frustration. The Brazilian government has so far carelessly 
wasted a unique opportunity to turn the original idea of the OGP into a new paradigm on open 
government initiatives. The governments of the US and the UK have not been much more 
inspiring. However, the dynamic of the OGP process in these two countries has been kept alive 
by the activism of two very strong and united civil society coalitions, OpenTheGovernment.Org 
in the US and the OGP civil society network in the UK. 
   The international structure and the guiding principles of the OGP may provide a blueprint for 
how to democratize national and global processes. The meaningful cooperation of governments 
and civil society actors can unfold tremendous democratic potential if seriously promoted by 
the governments. The Brazilian experience of participatory budgeting provides an illuminating 
example. Participatory budgeting programs have shown that an innovative and original idea 
alone does not guarantee its instant success. The idea, as innovative and original as it may be, 
needs to be taken seriously by those actors responsible for bringing it to life. Wampler found 
that participatory budgeting programs in Brazil were least successful when its actors did not 
adhere to four core principles, namely (1) the establishment of rules and mechanisms by 
government officials to create active citizen participation, (2) citizen involvement in decision- 
making which goes beyond mere feedback or consultation processes, (3) a strong social justice 
component empowering citizens from poorer communities and (4) improved transparency 
through citizen oversight (Wampler 2012, pp. 3-9). When municipal governments and civil 
society actors took seriously these four principles, the participatory budgeting program created 
D µYLUWXRXV F\FOH¶ and contributed to social change, promoting new forms of democratic 
interaction between the government and the citizens (Wampler 2012, p. 9).  
   The OGP represents the innovative attempt to internationalize the basic idea underlying 
participatory budgeting by making government processes more inclusive, transparent and 
democratic on the basis of meaningful civil society participation. The positive experiences of 
participatory budgeting programs emphasize that their success depends decisively on the 
activism of civil society and the political will of the governments to create meaningful 
participatory mechanisms to allow civil society actors to participate in the political decision-
making process on an equal footing with government officials (De Sousa Santos 1998; Fedozzi 
2014; Wampler 2012). Otherwise, participatory budgeting programs regularly failed.  
   The OGP highlights in its core principles the very same responsibilities and several founding 
governments gloriously celebrated them in statements and speeches. And civil society actors 
are more than prepared to assume their responsibilities. All three case studies have shown that 
civil society actors are organizHGLQIRUPHGDQGFRQYLQFHGRIWKH2*3¶VSRWHQWLDO7KHDUWLFOH
has also shown that even the most organized, passionate and engaged civil society coalition has 
no power to unlock this potential as long as it faces lukewarm ambition and half-hearted 
engagement from government officials. It is here where the governments are supposed to step 
in. As long as the governments do not take seriously their responsibilities, the OGP process in 
Brazil, the US and the UK is no more than smoke and mirrors.   
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